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TRADEMARK REGISTRATION UNDER SECTIONS
2(a) AND 2(e) OF THE IANHAM ACT:
THE DECEPTION DECISION
KENNETH B. GERMAIN*

I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HE concept of "deceptiveness" within the meaning of section 2
of the Lanham Act' has engendered considerable confusion among
the legislators who enacted it, the judges who have interpreted it, and
the commentators who have tried to analyze it. This Article will
attempt to demonstrate that the concept is not immune to clarification.
I.

THE DECEPTIVENESS PROVISIONS AND THEIR
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN BRIEF

Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides in relevant part:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it(a) Consists of or comprises . . . deceptive . . . matter ...

(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when applied to the goods of the applicant is merely
... deceptively misdescriptive of them, or (2) when applied to the goods of the applicant is
2
primarily geographically . . . deceptively misdescriptive of them ....

While it thus appears that a mark 3 that violates either section 2(a) or
2(e) cannot be registered, there is hope for section 2(e) violators because
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge the helpful assistance of Messrs. James Liles and Philip Doty, former University of
Kentucky law students, who did much of the research for this paper.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (e) (1970).

2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. According to the Lanham Act, " 'mark' includes any trade-mark, service mark, collective
mark, or certification mark entitled to registration under this chapter whether registered or not."
Id. § 1127. In more general usage, "mark" means anything used to identify source regardless of
whether it is registrable. See E. Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure § 1.10, at I (2d
ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Vandenburgh]. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1122 (4th ed.

1951). Professors Kitch and Perlman have noted with curiosity "that section 2(a) applies to
'trademarks,' [whereas] section 2(e) applies to 'marks' . . .

."

E. Kitch & H. Perman, Legal

Regulation of the Competitive Process 432 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kitch & Perlman].
However, this inconsistency probably betokens nothing more than a legislative miscue since the
term "trade-mark" used in the prefatory portion of section 2 should apply to the entire section,
including subsection (e); and under sections 3 and 4 of the Act, IS U.S.C. §§ 1053-54 (1970),
service, certification, and collective marks are registrable, 'Is]ubject to the provisions relating to
the registration of trade-marks." The insignificance of the distinction between "marks" and
"trademarks" is underscored by the fact that apparently no court has been concerned with this
distinction.
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section 2(f) permits registration of certain marks, including deceptively
misdescriptive marks, that have "become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce," '4 i.e., have acquired a "secondary meaning." 5 For
section 2(a) violators, however, there is no salvation whatsoever: no
amount of "distinctiveness" will purge the defect. For this reason, it
has aptly been said that section 2(a) is "more damning" than section
6
2(e).
The problem, of course, is to distinguish between section 2(a)
"deceptive" marks and section 2(e) "deceptively misdescriptive" marks.
However,
the statutory formulation lends little further guidance and indeed, some confusion:
although the consequences which attend disqualifications on these two deception
grounds clearly differ, the statute nowhere indicates the substance of the differences
between the disqualifications themselves. 7

Moreover, the legislative history of these sections provides no clarification either. This led one commentator to conclude that "[w]hat
scant legislative history there is, suggests only that both disqual4. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1970), provides that "[e]xcept as expressly excluded in paragraphs
(a)-(d) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." This section clearly
implies that, since paragraph (e) (deceptively misdescriptive) is not mentioned as an exception to
section 2(f, section 2(e) deceptively misdescriptive marks must be registrable under section 2()
upon a showing of secondary meaning. Accord, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Patent Office, Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 1208.05 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TMEP]; see W.D.
Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 318 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d
1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967); 1 A. Seidel, S. Dubroff, E.Gonda, Trademark Law and Practice § 17.01,
at 450 ("The purpose of Section 2(0 is to permit registration of those marks that are prohibited by
Section 2(e) and that have become distinctive of the applicant's goods."); Leeds, TrademarksThe Rationale of Registrability, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653, 662 (1958) ("it now seems settled
that [a deceptively misdescriptive] mark may be registered." (citing the GLASS WAX case,
discussed in text accompanying notes 77-84)). But see Schulmerich Electronics, Inc. v, J.C.
Deagan, Inc., 202 F.2d 772, 777 (C.C.P.A. 1953), which cast doubt upon the application of the
secondary meaning doctrine to section 2(e) "deceptively misdescriptive" marks by its dictum
rejecting the view "that a mark which is 'deceptively misdescriptive' within the meaning of
Section 2(e) . . . properly may be registered if it be distinctive of an applicant's goods."
5. Secondary meaning accrues when "a word or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily,
incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one
producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public,
the word or phrase [has] come to mean . . . to them, his trademark." G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912); see Kitch & Perlman, supra note 3, at 421-22; ! J.
McCarthy, Trademark and Unfair Competition § 15:2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McCarthy]. See
generally R. Oziel, Contemporary Trademark Problems in Contested Patent Office Proceedings
50-149 (1969).
6. W.D. Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 318 (T.T.A.B. 1965),
aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967); accord, M. Beran, An Introduction to Trademark Practice
88 (1970).

7.

P. Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines 294 (1973).
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ifications were intended to serve the same purposes. '" However, it has
also been stated that "[tihe colloquies occurring during several hearings
show differences of opinion and some inconsistencies and cannot be
considered conclusive in view of the specific action taken." 9 These are
just two illustrations of the differences of opinion spawned by the
uncertain meaning of sections 2(a) and 2(e) and their legislative history.
Not surprisingly, the varying interpretations of judges and commentators have increased rather than decreased this uncertainty.
IlI.

ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2 DECEPTIVENESS
AND DECEPTIVE MISDESCRIPTIVENESS

Marks that have some element of misdescription can be
classified into four categories: arbitrary, misdescriptive, deceptively
misdescriptive, and deceptive. It is hornbook trademark law that
"arbitrary" marks are registrable on the Principal Register immediately
upon "use in commerce," 10 as defined by section 45 of the Lanham
Act.11 "Misdescriptive"' 2 marks have not received much attention, but
there are fairly strong indications that they are treated just like
14
marks fall within
arbitrary marks.' 3 "Deceptively misdescriptive"'
8. Id., referring to Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on
Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 84-87 (1941); accord,
Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.40, at 105 n.12: "[T]hose present and testifying at the hearings
did not see any substantial difference between the prohibition against registration of 'deceptive'
marks in Section 2(a) and the prohibition against the registration of 'deceptively misdescriptive'
marks in Section 2(e)."
9. S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 276, 281 (Comm'r Pats. 1959); cf. In
re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687, 690 (T.T.A.B. 1969) ("The legislative hearings conducted prior to
the enactment of the Lanham Act shed no light on this question.").
10. 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 19:36-37; Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 2.20, at 57. Arbitrary
marks are registered pursuant to section 1 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970), without
recourse to section 2, id. § 1052, of that Act. Significantly, section 2 is phrased in terms of a mark's
registrability "unless" it violates one or more of the specific prohibitions of subsections (a)-(e).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
12. This term is used to refer to marks that are misdescriptive but not deceptively so. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
13. See discussion in text accompanying notes 56-58 infra; cf. National Lead Co. v. Wolfe,
223 F.2d 195, 199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955) (DUTCH BOY as applied to paint
products not made in Holland. "Neither the word 'Dutch,' nor the words 'Dutch Boy' are used
otherwise than in a fictitious, arbitrary and fanciful manner. Of course the word 'Dutch' is
capable of being used as a geographical term. If used to indicate a product made in Holland or by
some Dutch process, it could be a descriptive term. However, . . . appellants trade mark does
not contain words having either a geographical or descriptive sense.") Thus, there is a point
where a mark is so misdescriptive that the purchaser would not be deceived or confused by the
misdescriptiveness, but would recognize that it is being used in an arbitrary or fanciful sense. Cf.
note 42 infra.
deceptively
14. This term is used in lieu of the more cumbersome phrases "merely ...
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the prohibition of section 2(e) of the Act and cannot be registered
unless secondary meaning is demonstrated under section 2(f). "Deceptive" marks cannot be registered at all, due to section 2(a). Thus,
for purposes of registration, the four types of arguably deceptive marks
fall into three classes: (1) registrable upon use, (2) registrable upon
showing secondary meaning, (3) unregistrable. Although the real problem is discriminating between classes (2) and (3), a short discussion of
class (1) will provide instructive background. For this discussion and
the succeeding discussion of classes (2) and (3), the following chart,
which shows judicial and administrative classifications of numerous
trademarks, should be consulted.
misdescriptive" and "primarily geographically... deceptively misdescriptive," as found In section
2(e)(1) & (2) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1)-(2) (1970).
15. Included herein are marks that might be referred to as "suggestive." See the definition of
"suggestive" in note 42 infra.
16. Borden, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 447 (T.T.A.B. 1972). For
pre-Lanham Act cases involving ostensibly registrable "arbitrary" trademarks, see Holeproof
Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 172 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1909) (HOLEPROOF for hosiery); Eiseman v.
Schiffer, 157 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1907) (RADIUM for silk piece goods).
17. National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
18. In re Van Son Holland Ink Corp. of America, 147 U.S.P.Q. 292 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
19. In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. 246 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
20. In re International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. 262 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
21. Mem Co. v. Hes Co., 149 U.S.P.Q. 8 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
22. In re Yardley Inc., 165 U.S.P.Q. 272 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
23. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971);
see note 53 infra.
24. In re Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
25. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
26. W.D. Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313 (T.T.A.B. 1965),
aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
27. R. Neumann & Co. v. Bon-Ton Auto Upholstery, Inc., 326 F.2d 799 (C.C.PA. 1964).
28. R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
29. Caldwell Lace Leather Co. v. Western Filament, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 695 (T.T.A.I1.
1972).
30. Ex parte London Gramophone Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q. 362 (Comm'r Pats. 1953).
31. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
32. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
33. Ex parte Makers of Kal, Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. 504 (Comm'r Pats. 1957).
34. R. Neumann & Co. v. Bon-Ton Auto Upholstery, Inc., 326 F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
35. R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
36. Caldwell Lace Leather Co. v. Western Filament, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 695 (T.T.A.B.
1972).
37. Sponge & Chamois Institute v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 120 U.S.P.Q. 309 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
Here, an opposer challenged the marks as being "deceptive" and "deceptively misdescriptive" and
the court upheld the opposition on the basis that the mark was "deceptive and would result in
deception of the ...public," id. at 310, but no references were made to any specific section of the
statute.
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A.

Class 1: Marks Registrable Upon Use and
Without Secondary Meaning
Most of the marks in this class come within the following definition of
"arbitrary:"
Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., which are in common
linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest
42
nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services.

While it is easy to see why ICE CREAM was "so incongruous and
ludicrous"' 4 3 as applied to chewing gum as to be considered arbitrary
within the above definition, rather than "merely . .

.

deceptively

misdescriptive" within the meaning of section 2(e)(1), it is much harder
to justify classifying geographical marks in this category. The foundational case in this area involved the use of DUTCH and DUTCH
44
BOY for paints having no connection whatsoever with Holland.
Although the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that DUTCH had an
obvious geographical significance and was "capable of being used as a
geographical term, '45 it concluded that "[n]either the word 'Dutch,'
nor the words 'Dutch Boy' [was] used otherwise than in a fictitious,
arbitrary and fanciful manner. '4 6 The court implied that the pivotal

38. In re Salem China Co., 157 U.S.P.Q. 600 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
39. In re Richemond, 131 U.S.P.Q. 441 (T.T.A.B..1961).
40. In re Danish Maid Cultured Prods., Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 430 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
41. National Lead Co. v. Michigan Bulb Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 115 (Comm'r Pats. 1959)
(dictum).
42. 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:4, at 350; accord, In re Bonide Chem. Co., 46 F.2d 705,
706 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("The meaning of some descriptive words or devices used as trade-marks is
so foreign to the qualities or characteristics of the class of goods with which they are used as to
render it unlikely that they would ever be regarded as used descriptively or deceptively. In such
cases the marks are arbitrary and fanciful and form proper technical trade-marks."). As
mentioned in note 15 supra, "suggestive" marks are closely akin to "arbitrary" marks. "It cannot
be said that [suggestive marks] are primarily descriptive or that they are purely arbitrary or
fanciful without any indication of the nature of the goods which they denominate. Such terms,
indeed, shed some light upon the characteristics of the goods, but so applied they involve an
element of incongruity, and in order to be understood as descriptive, they must be taken In a
suggestive or figurative sense through an effort of the imagination on the part of the observer,"
General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940). Indeed, for all significant
purposes, suggestive marks are treated just like arbitrary marks. I McCarthy, supra note 5,
§ 11:20(A), at 388.
43. Borden, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 447 (T.T.A.B. 1972).
44. National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
45. Id.at 199.
46. Id. The court placed heavy reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in HamiltonBrown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916), a pre-Lanham Act case holding that
THE AMERICAN GIRL was not descriptive or geographically descriptive of shoes actually
made in America.
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issue was whether the misdescriptive term was deceptive, i.e.,
whether purchasers were misled.
Here there [was] no likelihood that the use of the name "Dutch" or "Dutch Boy" in
connection with the appellant's goods would be understood by purchasers as representing that the goods or their constituent materials were produced or processed in
Holland or that they are of the same
distinctive kind or quality as those produced,
47
processed or used in that place.

This approach, followed by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in
the HOLLAND INK48 and SWEDEN 4 9 cases, among others,5" may
be objectionable because these marks, particularly the national indicia

SWEDEN, and DUTCH and HOLLAND unadorned by BOY and

INK respectively,5 1 do tend to mislead the public into believing that
there is an actual geographical connection. 5 2 If this geographical
misdescriptiveness is "deceptive".5 3 in the sense of section 2(e)(2) of the
47. 223 F.2d at 199.
48. In re Van Son Holland Ink Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. 292 (T.T.A.B. 1965) (HOLLAND and
HOLLAND INK applied to inks and related printing products).
49. In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. 246 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (SWEDEN as applied
to artificial kidney machines).
50. See cases cited in notes 20-23 supra; cf. Fleischwaren-Export-Geselschaft v. Columbia
Packing Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 220 (T.T.A.B. 1973), where a section 2(e) opposition to
DEUTSCHMACHER for domestic delicatessen meats (including beerwurst, berliner and
frankfurters) was denied on the dubious ground that there was insufficient proof of the deceptive
effect of the mark, even though the English translation of the mark is "German Maker." There
the Board noted: "The mere fact that a mark may be comprised of a word or words having a
German or other foreign connotation does not in and of itself render the mark geographically...
deceptively misdescriptive." Id. at 221. The Board seems to have misused "connotation" for
"denotation" and ignored the basic principle that mere use of a foreign language does not divest
words of their descriptive content. See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 256
F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966), aft'd, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969) (action for auto repairman's
alleged infringement of VOLKSWAGEN); 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:14(B).
51. The distinction is suggested because the addition of a second word to the geographical
term may be viewed as diluting the geographical significance of that term. Professor McCarthy
aptly made this point in relation to the mark AMERICAN: "On the whole, courts have held that
the addition or variation of any element of AMERICAN, no matter how slight, will remove it
from the geographically descriptive category for American-based sellers. For example,
AMERICAN GIRL shoes, ALL AMERICAN on radios .... On the other hand, the unadorned,
simple word AMERICAN has been held geographically descriptive on paper cups, gasoline,
truck bodies, and automobile associations." 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 14:6, at 499 (footnotes
omitted); accord, Merchant, Deceptive and Descriptive Marks, 56 Trademark Rep. 141, 15S
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Merchant]; TMEP, supra note 4, § 1208.07; cf. marks involved in
cases cited in notes 20-22, all of which involved "suggestive" terms annexed to geographical
terms. The addition of the non-descriptive term BOY to DUTCH would seem more significant
than the addition of the descriptive word INK to HOLLAND.
52. "The use of a geographical word in a nongeographical sense is fraught with danger, the
word may not be understood in the sense intended, and may thus be deceptive . . . ." 3 R.
Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 72.6, at 209 (3d ed. 1969).
53. Of course, for section 2(e)(2) to apply the mark would have to be "primarily geographically ... deceptively misdescriptive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1970). In this regard it has recently
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Lanham Act, then the mark should be treated as unsuitably misdescriptive.5 4 Indeed, this view is supported by the Patent Office's refusal
to register LONDON for phonograph records of non-British origin,
even though the city of London did not have a reputation for that
industry, since "where the word in question is primarily the name of a
place and . . . the public might understand or think that the goods
originated there or have some association or connection with the place
. . . registration should be refused under section 2(e)." 55
However, as suggested earlier, little is gained by this analysis, since
even if a mark is "primarily geographically . . . misdescriptive" it is
not denied registration unless it is "deceptively" so;56 the issue once
more is focused on "deceptiveness." This. point was made by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals in holding that AUTOMATIC RADIO
was not deceptively misdescriptive of goods other than radios (in
particular, air conditioners) since "[t]he proscription is not against
misdescriptive terms unless they are also deceptive."- 7 The legislative
history of section 2(e) also supports this distinction between misdescriptive and deceptively misdescriptive.
Mr. THOMAS E. ROBERTSON. You mean the misdescriptive term is registrable, if
not deceptive?
Mr. MARTIN. Right.
Mr. POHL. That is right.
Mr. ROGERS. As an illustration, "ivory" is applied to soap. It is a perfectly good
trade-mark; but it is a descriptive term, but not as applied to soap.
Mr. POHL. .

.

5
. It is misdescriptive of soap, but it is not deceptive. 8

been noted that "[t]he word 'primarily' should not be overlooked, for it is not the intent of the federal
statute to refuse registration of a mark where the geographic meaning is minor, obscure, remote, or
unconnected with the goods." World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d
482, 486 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.60, at 113-15.
54. "Recognition of the word DUTCH as a trademark can be rationalized with what has been
initially said only on the ground that under the circumstances present in [that] case, the word in
question as applied to certain specified goods was no longer primarily geographical. Such cases are
rare." Merchant, supra note 51, at 156.
55. Ex parte London Gramophone Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q. 362, 363 (Comm'r Pats. 1953). But
cf. In re Yardley Inc., 165 U.S.P.Q. 272 (T.T.A.B. 1970), holding that LONDON LASHES was
registrable for brush-on lash lengthener not from London, and placing reliance upon In re Circus
Ices, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 64 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (allowed HAWAIIAN ICES to be registered forices not
connected with Hawaii).
56. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
57. In re Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (emphasis added);
accord, Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.40, at 102. This should answer in the affirmative Professors
Kitch and Perlman's query, "Is the term 'deceptively' a necessary modification of 'misdecriptive'?"
Kitch & Perlman, supra note 3, at 432.
58. Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the
House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1941).
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(This discussion led the legislators to annex the word "deceptively" to the
word "misdescriptive" in sections 2(e)(1) and (2)). 5 9
Thus, it all boils down to how to determine when a mark is
deceptive and when a misdescriptive mark is deceptively so. "The test
as to whether or not it is deceptive is how would it be regarded by the
"60 If
majority of purchasers at the time that the question arises ...
the purchasers view the misdescription as "arbitrary" the mark is
registrable without a hitch, but if they are deceived into believing that
there61is an actual connection the mark falls under sections 2(e) and/or

2(a).

Classes 2 and 3: Distinguishing Between "Deceptively
62
Misdescriptive" and "Deceptive" Marks
As a preliminary matter it is important to dispel the notion that
there might be no real difference between section 2(a) "deceptiveness"
and section 2(e) "deceptive misdescriptiveness."
B.

Since the words "or deceptively misdescriptive" were specifically added to Section 2(e)
when paragraph (f) and paragraph (a) were already in the present form as far as the
present question is concerned, it can only be concluded that there must have been
some reason for the addition of the phrase. If the scope of "deceptively misdescriptive"
recited in paragraph (e) is precisely the same as or contained entirely within the scope
of the meaning of the word "deceptive" recited in paragraph (a), then the addition of
the words to paragraph (e), particularly in view of the presence of paragraph (f), could
only be taken as a wholly meaningless act. It must be concluded that, while the scope
of the two phrases may overlap in that something included in 2(a) may also be included
in 2(e), the phrase in paragraph (e) must include some things which are not included
within the scope of paragraph (a). Hence it cannot be stated as a matter of law that if
something is barred [from] registration under paragraph (e) as being deceptively
63
misdescriptive it is ipso facto barred [from] registration under paragraph (a).
59.

See Merchant, supra note 51, 147-48.

60. Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.40, at 102-03 (footnote omitted); accord, I McCarthy, supra
note 5, § 14:3, at 490; cf. In re Van Son Holland Ink Corp. of America, 147 U.S.P.Q. 292 (T.T.A.B.
1965).

61.

Consequently, Professors Kitch and Perlman must receive a negative answer to their

question, "Would'Old Crow Whiskey' be denied registration under [section] 2(a) or 2(e) unless it were
made from old crows?" Kitch & Perlman, supra note 3, at 432.
62. For a discussion of pre-Lanham Act law touching upon deceptiveness affecting registrability
under the 1905 Act see Merchant, supra note 51, at 141-46, 148-50.
63. S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 276, 281 (Comm'r Pats. 1959);
accord, In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687, 690 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (observed the distinction between
sections 2(a) and 2(e) with regard to registration on the Supplemental Register); W.D. Byron & Sons
v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313,317-18 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A.
1967) ("since deceptive marks are precluded by Section 2(a) of the Statute and deceptively
misdescriptive marks [are precluded] by Section 2(e) (1), it is logical to assume that the framers of the
Statute intended them to be mutually exclusive, the former being more damning than the latter." Id.
at 318).
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Assuming that a distinction does exist, it is obviously a crucial one
since, as stated earlier, "deceptively misdescriptive" marks can be
salvaged by showing secondary meaning whereas "deceptive" ones
'65
cannot. 64 Unfortunately, "[t]he line . . . is a difficult one to draw,
and courts tend to circumvent the issue whenever possible. 6 6 For
example, without making any attempt to differentiate between sections
2(a) and 2(e), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has held that a
67
mark is neither "deceptively misdescriptive" nor "deceptive.1
Conversely, the Board has disposed of an opposer's dual objections to
deceptiveness and deceptive misdescriptiveness by banning the mark
as "deceptive" without distinguishing between the two grounds or
indicating whether it had relied upon section 2(a) or 2(e). 68 In a third case
the Board viewed the deceptive and deceptively misdescriptive claims as
being different and so disposed of them individually. In so doing,
however, it did not indicate any basis for distinguishing between the
two. 69 Likewise, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals once disposed
of opposition claims based on sections 2(a) and 2(e) by explicitly denying
the 2(e) objection on the ground that the mark was not deceptively
misdescriptive, and implicitly denying the 2(a) objection by affirming the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's disposition.7 0 The dissent, on the
other hand, condemned the mark without articulating whether it was
7
deceptive or deceptively misdescriptive or both. 1
Even more illustrative of this point are two fairly recent decisions by
That sections 2(a) and 2(e) are distinct, the former being more damning than the latter, is further
evidenced by the fact that the cancellation procedure under section 14(c) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970), is available to attack registration of a section 2(a) deceptive mark, but Is
not available to attack a section 2(e) deceptively misdescripive mark. See W.D. Byron & Sons v. Stein
Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 317 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
64. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
65. 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 14:12, at 511 (footnote omitted).
66. For example, in one of the few cases facing the issue, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
commented: "There have been only a few decisions involving the registrability of a geographical term
under Section 2(a) or Section 2(e) (2); but, nowhere in these decisions has the deciding tribunal had the
occasion or felt the need to engage in a discussion pertaining to the differences between these
subsections of Section 2 and the appropriate conditions for their application." In re Amerise, 160
U.S.P.Q. 687, 690 (T.T.A.B. 1969). But see text accompanying note 74 infra.
67. A.F. Gallun & Sons v. Aristocrat Leather Prods., Inc., 135 U.S.P.Q. 459
(T.T.A.B. 1962) (COPY CALF for imitation leather wallets).
68. Caldwell Lace Leather Co. v. Western Filament, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 695 (TT.A.B. 1972);
Sponge & Chamois Institute v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 120 U.S.P.Q. 309, 310 (T.T.A.B. 1959)
(CHAMI SPONGE for synthetic sponges).
69. W.D. Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 317-18 (T.T.A.B. 1965),
aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
70. Steinberg Bros. v. New England Overall Co., 377 F.2d 1004 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (NUHIDE for
dungarees).
71. Id. at 1006 (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting).
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the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which held that two marks
were both "deceptive" and "deceptively misdescriptive" without offering any explanation whatsoever regarding the difference. 72 That court
further compounded the confusion by stating in one of these cases that
"no trademark rights can be acquired in a trademark that is deceptive
or deceptively misdescriptive" 73-a statement that is flatly inconsistent
with the registrability of "deceptively misdescriptive" marks that have
acquired secondary meaning under section 2(f).
When the courts have found marks violative of either section 2(a) or
2(e) they usually have not had to explain the difference between the two
sections because only one or the other was involved in the pleadings. 74 In
only two cases 75 has the issue been directly 76 met. These cases will now be

discussed.
72. R. Neumann & Co. v. Bon-Ton Auto Upholstery, Inc., 326 F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(VYNAHYDE for non-leather products); R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d
786, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (DURA-HYDE for non-leather products).
73. R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786, 788 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
74. The following cases applied section 2(a) without considering section 2(e): In re Salem China
Co., 157 U.S.P.Q. 600 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (AMERICAN LIMOGES); In re Danish Maid Cultured
Prods., Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 430 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (DANISH MAID); In re Richemond, 131 U.S.P.Q.
441 (T.T.A.B. 1961) (MAID IN PARIS). The following cases applied section 2(e) without
considering section 2(a): Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273 (C.C.P.A. 1963)
(AMERICAN BEAUTY); Ex parte London Gramophone Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q. 362 (Comm'r Pats.
1953) (LONDON).
75. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nom. S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); In re
Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
76. The issue was dealt with indirectly in Imperial Knife Associated Cos. v. National Silver
Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. 209 (T.T.A.B. 1966). There the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sustainedan
opposition to PARISIENNE as applied to drinkware and stemware. In so doing it rejected the
applicant's defense that because the goods to which the opposers mark was applied (knives, forks,
and spoons) were not manufactured in Paris the opposer had "unclean hands." The defense was
rejected because the Board found that PARISIENNE as applied to the opposers American.made
product was not "geographically deceptive."
The term "geographically deceptive" seems to be a hybrid of sections 2(a) and 2(e), but this is
uncertain since the Board did not refer to either section. Its reasoning seemed to implicate both
sections, along the lines of GLASS WAX. First it stated: "In our opinion, while the word
'Parisienne' is defined as a Parisian woman or girl, it would not indicate that applicant's goods...
are of French origin." Id. at 210 (footnote omitted). This conclusion seems to imply that the Board
found that the mark was not geographically misdescriptive under section 2(e).
Secondly, the Board stated that "any geographic significance which the term might possess is not of
such a nature that it would induce prospective purchasers into buying [its] products... ." Id. The
Board's reference to inducement of purchasers is reminiscent of the "influenced to purchase"
reference in GLASS WAX, see text accompanying note 82 infra, and this would seem to indicate
that the Board in effect was applying section 2(a). That it was in fact applying section 2(a) is apparent
from its reliance on In re Van Son Holland Ink Corp. of America, 147 U.S.P.Q. 292 (T.T.A.B.
1965), a factually similar case (HOLLAND and HOLLAND INK as applied to inks not made in
Holland) decided under section 2(a) and which also employed an "inducement" analysis. 'ITIhe
question for consideration is whether or not [the geographical significance of the mark] would induce
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In the GLASS WAX case, 7 7 the federal district court was called
upon to decide whether that mark was arbitrary, descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, or deceptive as applied to a waxless cleaner
for glass and metal. The Trademark Examiner had earlier concluded
that the mark was not deceptive, but was either descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive and therefore was unregistrable since no
78
evidence of secondary meaning had been presented by the applicant.
The Commissioner of Patents agreed that the mark was either descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive, and so affirmed the refusal to
register, but without reaching the section 2(a) "deceptiveness" question. 79 Fortunately, however, the district court did reach the question
and in so doing provided a basis on which to analyze deceptiveness.
The district court held that GLASS WAX was not "deceptive"
under section 2(a), but was "deceptively misdescriptive" under section
2(e)(1). Consequently, it affirmed the Patent Office's disposition of the
case, while clarifying the deceptiveness issue. However, it refused to
rule on the applicant's secondary meaning argument, preferring to
defer to the expertise and procedures of the Patent Office in accordance
with the legislative intent to vest the Patent Office with initial resolution
of this matter.80
As to "deceptive misdescriptiveness," the court stated:
[Tihe product contains either no wax, or wax in insufficient quantity to justify use of
the word . . .. [Clustomers might justifiably believe it does contain the element wax,
whether or not it was significant to them in purchasing the product . . '

More instructively, however, as to "deceptiveness" the court, expressly
following the lead of the Examiner of Interferences, concluded that:
[The absence of "wax" in GLASS WAX] does not automatically make the mark
deceptive for the purposes of registration. The evidence does not establish that
customers have been misled. To the contrary, it appears that the product satisfies the
needs of the customers; that the average or ordinary customer cares little about, and
knows little about, the scientific composition of the product.... The evidence does not
show that the public has been influenced to purchase the product on account of

prospective purchasers into buying applicant's products on the basis of this supposed geographic
origin, in that the products possess some superior qualities or other attributes because of such origin."
Id.
77. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nom. S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956),
78. Id.at 931.
79. S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 90 U.S.P.Q. 373, 379 (Comm'rPats. 1951). See text
accompanying 66-72 supra.
80. 129 F. Supp. at 936-37.
81. Id. at 935 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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believing that it contained wax, or that the product was simply a wax to be placed
upon glass.82

Most significantly, the court then set out the following test for deception under section 2(a):
[D]eception is found when an essential and material element is misrepresented, is
distinctly false, and is the very element upon which the customer reasonablyrelies in
purchasing one product over another.83

The upshot of the court's analysis seems to be that section 2(a)
deception will be found only where there is material falsity, that is,
falsity that directly affects the purchasing decision by virtue of the
purchaser's reliance.8 4 Section 2(e) "deceptive misdescriptiveness," also
involves falsity that deceives the purchaser, but the falsity is immaterial
because the purchaser is not concerned with and does not rely upon such

falsity.

In In re Amerise,8 5- the only other case that directly raised the issue
of "deceptive" versus "deceptively misdescriptive," the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board implicitly concluded that ITALIAN MAIDE,
the phonetic equivalent of Italian made, was "deceptively misdescriptive"
as applied to canned vegetables in no way connected with
Italy.8 6 The Board adopted the following test for geographically deceptive misdescriptiveness:
It thus appears that the criteria for determining the registrability of a geographical
designation under Section 2(e) (2) are whether the term conveys primarily or immediately
a geographical connotation as to the origin of the goods in connection w-ith which it is used
and then whether the goods do in fact come from that geographical area. If they do not,
87
then the mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of such goods.

In formulating this test, the Board placed heavy reliance upon the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals case wherein AMERICAN

BEAUTY was held to be "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" as applied to Japanese-made sewing machines because
the mark suggested that the product was made in the U.S.A.8 8 The
ITALIAN MAIDE Board adopted the AMERICAN BEAUTY court's
conclusion that such a mark
82. Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Section 2(a) "deception," as interpreted by this Article, is analogous to common law fraud,
which requires, inter"alia proof of reliance by the complainant. Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454,
20 N.E. 376 (1889); W. Prosser, Torts § 108, at 714 (4th ed. 1971).
85. 160 U.S.P.Q. 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
86. Id. at 691-92.
87. Id. at 691.
88. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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"gives a false indication of geographical origin to that segment of the purchasing public
which may be interested in the country of
origin and in purchasing American-made
8 9
goods and it is likely to deceive them".

Unfortunately, the AMERICAN BEAUTY court also concluded
that "the misdescriptiveness under the circumstances of this case would
necessarily be deceptive." 90 This test for section 2(e) is disturbingly
similar to the GLASS WAX court's test for section 2(a), a test that
used as its touchstone material falsity likely to influence the purchasing
decision. 91 By using this test, and by failing to discuss the applicability
of section 2(a)-which admittedly had not been mentioned in the
pleadings 2 -it may have further befuddled an already quite confusing
area. Fortunately, the ITALIAN MAIDE Board did not adopt this
aspect of the AMERICAN BEAUTY court's reasoning.
The ITALIAN MAIDE Board next delineated its test for section
2(a) deceptiveness:
As to Section 2(a), this Board has, in view of the absolute bar to the registration of a
mark under this section, taken the position that a mark consisting of or comprising a
geographical term is not deceptive under Section 2(a) unless it involves a false assertion
calculated, either planned, designed, or implied to deceive the public as to the
geographical origin of the goods bearing the mark. This contemplates situations where a
party applies a geographical designation to a particular product knowing that it will
bestow upon the product an appearance of greater quality or saleability not actually
possessed by it with the intention thereby of inducing or misleading a particularclass of
consumers into purchasingthis product. While such intent is often difficult to prove and
especially in ex parte proceedings, intent can and has been inferred under those
circumstances where a geographical areaor place is well-known for the particular product
as France for perfumes, Denmark for cheese, Switzerland for watches, and so forth. 9

Furthermore, the Board interpreted precedent as holding that "deception
.. .under Section 2(a), is not present where a geographical trademark
may involve a degree of untruth but the deception may be perfectly
innocent, harmless or negligible. '94 This is intriguing both because of the
use of the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and," and because
89. 160 U.S.P.Q. at 691, quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273,
276 (C.C.P.A. 1963). Ironically, the Board referred only in passing to an extremely similar
pre-Lanham case, Campana Corp. v. Glanzberg, 10 F. Supp. 876, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1935), that held
that ITALIAN BALM was registrable under the 1905 Act even though it was "in the broad sense
of the word, deceptive" as applied to an American-made product.
90. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d at 276 (emphasis added).
91. See discussion in text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
92. "The sole ground of opposition asserted in this court is... section 2(e) (2)....."319 F.2d at
274.

93. 160 U.S.P.Q. at 691 (emphasis added).
94. Id. As the Board indicated, somewhat obliquely, this test was coined in the pre-Lanham
ITALIAN BALM case of Carnpana Corp. v. Glanzberg, 10 F. Supp. 876, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1935);
see note 89 supra.
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the Board placed as much emphasis on the applicant's intent to deceive as
on the actual deceptiveness of the applicant's mark. The emphasis on
intent is an ill-advised position, both because of the great difficulty of
proving intent, and, more importantly, because intent is nowhere
mentioned or even alluded to in section 2 or any other section of the
Lanham Act related to registration."
The Board's view of the proper law to be applied to the ITALIAN
MAIDE mark also merits mention. It first concluded that the mark
fell "within the [non-deceptive] category of cases," 9 6 because of its
double entendre, as well as the fact that Italy is not particularly
associated with canned vegetables, and the fact that American consumers are accustomed to seeing American products such as spaghetti
sauce sold under Italian marks. It then decided that section 2(a) did
not apply, and it finally concluded that the case should be "remanded to
the examiner for consideration of the sufficiency of applicant's evidence
in support of his claim of distinctiveness" 97-a result that can be
explained only on the basis of section 2(e)(2). In other words, the Board
impliedly held that ITALIAN MAIDE was deceptively misdescriptive-the correct result, it is submitted-without expressly saying
so or directly applying its own test of deceptive misdescriptiveness.
IV.

NON-DECISIONAL VIEWS OF DECEPTIVENESS V.

DECEPTIVE MISDESCRIPTIVENESS
By way of demonstration that scholars are every bit as mortal as
,judges, a noted authority added no clarity to the deceptiveness issue by
his assessment that "[a]ny mark that is merely deceptively misdescriptive under the prohibition against registration in Section 2(e) ... may
also be within the prohibition against registration of 'deceptive' marks in
Section 2(a), although a distinction has been drawn between the two." 98

95. Proof of actual intent to deceive is, however, fairly persuasive evidence that the deception
was material and the applicant believed he would succeed in deceiving: why else would he try?
This indirect approach is analogous to the well-accepted doctrine in infringement cases that when
there has been intentional counterfeiting of another's mark, confusion between the two marks wiiU
be presumed to exist. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d464, 466-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (195S) (proof of actual intent
to copy "gives riseto a powerful inference that confusion is likely, and puts on the alleged infringer the
burden of going forward with proof that it is not." Id. at 467.); My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d
76, 77 (2d Cir. 1934); 2 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 23:32(A); id. (Supp. 1974); Vandenburgh, supra
note 3, § 5.20, at 146.

96.

In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687, 691 (T.T.A.B. 1969).

97.

Id. at 692; see TMEP, supra note 4, § 1208.07, at 118.

98.

Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.40, at 105. However, a new footnote to Vandenburgh's
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Then to make matters worse, in the accompanying explanatory footnote he stated that "[i]f the mark is not deceptive under Section 2(a) the
question of whether the mark is deceptively misdescriptive under Section

2(e)(1) is moot, the former being more damning than the latter." 99 This
view, however, was rejected by W.D. Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros.
Mfg. Co., 0 0 which this authority apparently misinterpreted." 0"
Treatise-writers Seidel, Dubroff and Gonda propounded the following test:

If the mark tends to mislead the purchaser into believing he is purchasing something
that he is not, then the trademark is considered to be deceptive [section 2(a)]. If he is
under the belief that he is purchasing the item but that it has qualities that are not
actually present, then the mark would be considered misdescriptive [section 2(e)]. 112

As support for this test based upon deception as to the item itself, as

opposed to deception only as to the qualities of the item, Seidel cited
quoted statement about section 2(a) deceptive marks contains the following language from In re
Amerise: " '[A] mark consisting of or comprising a geographical term is not deceptive under Section
2(a) unless it involves a false assertion calculated, either planned, designed, or implied to deceive the
public as to the geographical origin of the goods bearing the mark. This contemplates situations
where a party applies a geographical designation to a particular product knowing that it will bestow
upon the product an appearance of greater quality or saleability not actually possessed by It with the
intention thereby of inducing or misleading a particular class of consumers into purchasing this
product.' "Id. at n.9. 1(Supp. 1973), quoting In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687, 691 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
99. Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.40, at 105 n.10, referring to W. D. Byron & Sons v.
Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 318 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A.
J
1967), cited in notes 4, 6 & 63 supra.
100. 146 U.S.P.Q. 313 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
101. The Byron Board stated that "[t]he question whether or not [the mark] is deceptively
misdescriptive within Section 2(e) (1) ... would appear to be moot, in view of the holding that
[the mark] is not . . deceptive . . . ." Id. at 318. Perhaps the Board should have emphasized the
word "appear," to underscore the fact that it was rejecting this view in favor of the view that
sections 2(a) and 2(e) are "mutually exclusive." Id. The entire discussion was dictum, however,
since the Board did not decide the question of deceptive misdescriptiveness. Rather, it found
secondary meaning, which would have overcome deceptive misdescriptiveness and which
therefore rendered unnecessary a finding as to deceptive misdescriptiveness. Accord, S.C.
Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 90 U.S.P.Q. 373, 379 (Comm'r Pats. 1951) (dictum).
102. 1 A. Seidel, S. Dubroff & E. Gonda, Trademark Law and Practice § 6.01, at 146 (1963);
accord, Merchant, supra note 51, at 151. Although neither Seidel, supra, nor Merchant expressly
acknowledged it, this line of demarcation was suggested earlier in a footnote in the GLASS WAX
case which stated: "Cases cited by defendants to support their charge of deception involved marks
which were deceptive or misleading in that they represented to the public that the article was
something essentially different from the thing which they actually received. Here the evidence
shows that customers sought a cleaner and were well satisfied. Had the evidence shown that
customers bought the product as a wax for glass, a different problem would have been presented
to the Court." Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 934 n.10 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nom.
S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
829 (1956).
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the pre-Lanham CROW-TOX case.' 0 3 In that case the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the Patent Office's refusal to
register CROW-TOX as applied to a non-poisonous pest repellent
because the mark failed to accurately describe the product. 0 4 Seidel
opined that this case would come under section 2(e) of the Lanham
Act, thus suggesting that the deception went to a quality, i.e.,
poisonousness of the product, rather than to the nature of the product
itself, that is, a poison.' 0 5 The mere statement of this supposed
distinction should serve to demonstrate its ineffectiveness.
The Patent Office's Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
(TMEP) is designed to "provide trademark examiners in the Patent
Office, trademark applicants, and attorneys and representatives for
trademark applicants, with a reference work on the practices and
procedures relative to prosecution of applications to register marks in
the Patent Office." 10 6 It sets forth an interesting view on deceptively
misdescriptive geographical marks:
If it is determined that the mark is primarily descriptive of geographic source, and the
goods or services are not from that source, then the mark is primarily geographically
mis-descriptive. Because of its primarily geographical character, the misdescriptiveness of the mark contains a possibility of deception, since the public is likely to
recognize the geographical suggestion of origin and may be misled by it. Such a mark
should be refused on the Principal Register, but it can be considered for registration
. . . in accordance with Section 2(f) ....

If it is considered that there is actual deception . . . due to the misdescriptiveness
contained in the primary geographic meaning of the mark, the Examiner must apply
Section 2(a). °7

This test based on "possibility of deception" versus "actual deception"
is objectionable because the distinction is difficult to make.' 0 8 It is
103.
104.

In re Bonide Chem. Co., 46 F.2d 705 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
Id. at 708-09.

105. 1 A. Seidel, S. Dubroff & E. Gonda, Trademark Law and Practice § 601, at 146 (1963).
106. Tegtmeyer, Foreword to TMEP, supra note 4, at iii.
107. TMEP, supra note 4, § 1208.05 (emphasis added to "possibility of deception" and "actual
deception").

108. Admittedly, this distinction does have an operational analogue in infringement cases.
For example, section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 1S U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970), uses "likelihood of
confusion" as the test of infringement. However, it is quite clear that mere "likelihood" of
confusion is sufficient only for injunctive relief, actual confusion being required for monetary
relief. Id.; see 2 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 30:5; cf. Hubbard, Monetary Recovery Under the
Copyright, Patent, and Trademark Acts, 58 Trademark Rep. 560, 588 (1968). Nevertheless, this
"possibility" versus "actual" distinction does not seem appropriate in the registration context
where the relief afforded for "violations" of either section 2(a) or section 2(e) is basically the same
-refusal to register. Yet it could be counter-argued that a "possibly" deceptive mark-a section
2(e) mark under the TMEP analysis-should be treated as registrable (upon proof of section 2(f)
secondary meaning), whereas an "actually" deceptive mark-a section 2(a) mark under the
TMEP analysis-should be treated as unregistrable.
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noteworthy that the TMEP does not suggest any procedure for drawing this distinction.
More significantly, the TMEP contains a second test for section 2(a)
geographical deceptiveness-one that strongly suggests the influence of
the GLASS WAX "materiality" test. 10 9
The use of a term of geographic meaning is deceptive under Section 2(a) if the term Is
of such nature that it misleads as to geographicalsource, so that purchasers are moved
to buy or not to buy in the belief that the goods or services originate in the place
indicated. 1I0

This test would have been more effectively stated if it had emphasized
the phrase "so that purchasers are moved to buy in the belief that the
goods or services originate in the place indicated," rather than emphasizing the preceding phrase. The emphasis on the importance of
purchasers' motivations was supplied in the paragraph following the
quotation under discussion: "If purchasers do not rely on the term
and are not influenced by it, they are neither mislead [sic] nor deceived." 1"
The TMEP enumerates the factors to be considered in deciding
whether a mark is geographically deceptive under section 2(a). They are:
the type of goods or services to which the mark is applied; how well known the area is
as a place of production of the goods or performance of the services; and the attitude of
purchasers as to whether they rely in their purchasing on the term as indicating
geographical origin. 12

In keeping with its definition of geographical deception, therefore, the

Trademark Manual includes purchaser-motivation as a factor to be
considered in evaluating deceptiveness.
Professor McCarthy's generally excellent treatise' 3 does not shed
much light on the section 2(a) versus section 2(e) issue. He starts in this
cryptic fashion:
A mark may be "deceptively misdescriptive" under § 2(e) if it misrepresents any fact
concerning the goods which may materially induce a purchaser's decision to buy. A
similar line between marks "deceptive" under § 2(a) and "primarily geographically
[deceptively] misdescriptive" under § 2(e) is closely analogous to the deceptive-deceptively
114
misdescriptive distinction ....

This is followed by references to the "intention" test set out in the
109.

See discussion in text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.

110.

TMEP, supra note 4, § 1208.06 (emphasis in original).

ill.
112.
113.
114.

Id.; see id. § 1202.02.
Id. § 1208.06.
McCarthy, supra note 5; see Germain, Book Review, 61 Ky. L.J. 931 (1973).
1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:19, at 385.
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ITALIAN MAIDE"15 and SWEDEN cases' 16 and proceeds to an
analysis of the GLASS WAX case, 117 about which he concludes as
follows:
The GLASS WAX decision did not draw a very clear or definite line between
"deceptive" under § 2(a) and "deceptively misdescriptive" under § 2(e). Some element
of deception is present in both characterizations. But the apparent distinction in the
GLASS WAX Case was the importance of the misdescriptive connotation upon the
purchasing decisions of the consumer. I

Thus, Professor McCarthy, though referring to the "intention" test,
implicitly acknowledged the "materiality" test, but, unfortunately,
failed to evaluate either.
Probably the-best, and earliest, analysis of this problem was penned
in 1958 by Assistant Commissioner Daphne Leeds. Based on the
GLASS WAX case, Leeds wrote:
The distinction between a "deceptive" mark and a "deceptively misdescriptive" mark,

within the meaning of the prohibitory provisions of the statute, seems to be that if
purchasers are moved by the misdescriptive word or term to buy the product.., the
mark is "deceptive"; but if purchasers buy the product because it has given satisfaction
and they do not care whether or not it contains or is the misdescribed product, the
mark is "deceptively misdescriptive."' 19

With regard to geographic marks she had this to say:
In determining whether or not a mark is geographically deceptively misdescriptive
when applied to the goods, one need only ask: Is it a geographical name or term which is
likely to suggest that the product comes from the place or region named by the mark? If the
answer is in the affirmative, the mark is "deceptively misdescriptive." Are purchasers
likely to care whether or not the product comes from the place o region which the mark
identifies? If the answer is in the negative, the mark is"deceptively misdescriptive"; butif
the affirmative, it is "deceptive" and unregistrable under another provision of the act.

This is to say thatif a locality identified by a geographical name or term is known or noted
for the production of goods in the category of applicant's, or for components ofsuch goods,
and purchasers are moved by the geographical name to buy the goods in the belief that
they originate in the locality named, the geographical name or term is "deceptive" as
applied to the goods. 20

Thus, Leeds analyzed both geographical and nongeographical deceptiveness in terms of "materiality," i.e., would the misdescription
"move" the purchaser to purchase the goods or services.
115. In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969); see notes 93-94 supra and accompanying
text
116. In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. 246 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
117. Gold Seal Co. v. weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nor. S.C. Johnson
& Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
118. 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:19, at 386 (emphasis added).
119. Leeds, Trademarks-The Rationale of Registrability, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653, 662-63
(1958).
120. Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Material deceptiveness is deemed most offensive and dangerous and
accordingly is classified as fatally unregistrable under section 2(a). If
not material, the deceptiveness is deemed less offensive and dangerous
and is only initially unregistrable as deceptively misdescriptive under
section 2(e), and may be salvaged by section 2(f) secondary meaning.
In this fashion consumers are adequately protected from material
deceptions and are even given the initial benefit of the doubt vis-h-vis
"immaterial" deceptions.
By focusing on materiality, courts can protect consumers' interests by
using section 2(e) to reject possibly misleading marks1 2 1 (like DUTCH
and HOLLAND) without necessarily damning them to eternal unregistrability under section 2(a). 122 This would be consistent with the current
widespread concern for the consumer and with the Federal Trade
1 23
Commission's insistence on complete truthfulness in advertising,
particularly as such advertising may be interpreted by very unsophisticated persons. 12 4 It is also in keeping with the widely-held belief that the
121. Although this approach has the effect of discriminating between "actually" deceptive and
"possibly" deceptive marks, the analytical starting point of materiality distinguishes this approach
from the TMEP analysis discussed in notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
122. See In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687, 690 (T.T.A.B. 1969), where the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board noted that registrations were being improperly denied because Trademark
Examiners were analyzing "deceptive" marks solely in terms of section 2(a) and failing to
recognize the intermediate category of section 2(e) deceptive misdescriptiveness. Conversely, it Is
plausible to speculate that if the opponents of registration in the cases referred to in In re Amerise, Id.
at 691, had argued section 2(e), they might have succeeded in blocking registration-perhaps
rightfully so-in the absence of secondary meaning. Cf. 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:19, at 386
("The court in the GLASS WAX case was obviously straining not to hold the mark 'deceptive' under
§ 2(a) for such a decision would have barred the mark from any registration at all . .. M.
123. See section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(l) (1970), outlawing
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce;" P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th
Cir. 1950), where the court said: "To tell less than the whole truth is a well known method of
deception; and he who deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the deception by relying
upon the truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been accomplished." See also section
14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970), empowering the FTC to petition for cancellation of
marks for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness; FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46
(1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); M. Beran, An Introduction to
Trademark Practice 11-12 (1970), cautioning that misdescriptive or deceptive marks "[n]ot only will
.. be deemed objectionable when registration is sought, but there is the definite possibility that the
Federal Trade Commission might object to the use of the trademark on grounds that it constitutes
false and misleading advertising and hence is prohibited under the Federal Trade Commission Act."
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted); Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 Fordliam L.
Rev. 363, 373 (1974), arguing for greater FTC involvement in policing trademarks.
124. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); Charles of the
Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1944); Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C.
1282 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
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use of descriptive and geographically descriptive trademarks should be
discouraged. 12s
Lastly, the materiality test is workable. Admittedly, it is somewhat
subjective, requiring a presumably sophisticated examiner or tribunal to
determine what is in the mind of a diverse and often unsophisticated
public, i.e., what the public thinks the mark means and whether it cares
about an inaccuracy. However, these determinations depend largely
upon objective evidence contained in the record, e.g., testimonial or
survey materials that manifest consumers' interpretations of the marks
involved. 126 Indeed, this is the very type of approach used daily by the
courts and the Patent and Trademark Office to determine whether a
mark poses a likelihood of confusing the public as to the origin of the
goods or services to which the mark is applied.1 27 Thus, if it is determined
that members of the public believe that SWEDEN artificial kidney
machines were made in Sweden, but it is further determined thatthey do
not care whether they were made there or not, then section 2(e) is
appropriate; whereas, if it is determined that they do care-ostensibly
because they believe that Swedish-make medical machinery
is superior in
28
some way-then section 2(a) would be appropriate.1
125. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 5, § 11:5(C); Vandenburgh, supra note 3, § 4.60.
126. This objective, consumer-oriented approach is very different from the subjective,
applicant-oriented 'Intent to deceive" approach approved of in the ITALIAN MAIDE and
SWEDEN cases (see notes 93, 115-116 supra and accompanying text). The "intent to deceive" test
requires peering into the applicant's mind to ascertain whether he intended to deceive-a very
difficult and truly subjective endeavor.
127. See, e.g., Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co., 335 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.
1964); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 461,463, 464 (1st Cir. 1962); LaTouraine Coffee Co. v.
Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 771(1946); Heublein, Inc. v.
David Sherman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (E.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.
1965); 2 McCarthy, supra note 5, §§ 23:1-24. See generally R. Oziel, Contemporary Trademark
Problems in Contested Patent Office Proceedings 116-34 (PLI 1969). Butsee Fort Howard Paper Co.
v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 376 F.2d 904, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Rex Shoe Co. v. JuvenileShoe Corp.
of America, 273 F.2d 179, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1959) ("Whether marks are likely to cause confusion or
mistake or deceive average purchasers is, in final analysis, a matterof opinion."); 2 McCarthy, supra

note 5, § 23:26.
128. This approach also helps answer Professors Kitch and Perman's questions "Would use
of the mark 'Old Crow Whiskey' be in violation of section 43(a)?" and "How do these various
provisions [sections 2(a), 2(e), 43(a)] interrelate?" Kitch & Perlman, supra note 3, at 432.
Section 43(a) authorizes a civil action against one who uses "a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation" with relation to goods or services in interstate commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). According to one authority, actions under section 43(a) require proof of (1)
falsity, (2)actualor potential deception, (3) materiality to the purchaser, and(4) likelihood of injury to
the complainant. Weil, Protectihility of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertising,
44 Calif. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1956); accord, Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783
(N.D. Ill. 1974); Germain, Unfair Trade Practices under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've
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CONCLUSION

A careful reading of section 2 of the Lanham Act, with special
sensitivity to the crucial differences between subsections (a) and (e),
and an examination of judicial and non-judicial interpretations of
those subsections, strongly suggests that "materiality" is the factor that
separates the two kinds of marks. To illustrate this point and the
various other conclusions drawn in this paper, the following analysis of
the fictitious trademark LOKEN LOLLIPOPS1 29 is presented:
Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84, 95-100 (1973), reprinted in 64
Trademark Rep. 193, 205-09 (1974), 13 Publishing Entertainment Advertising L.Q. 215, 228-33
(1974); see Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nom. S.C.
Johnson v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); cf.
Middletown Mfg. Co. v. Super Sagless Corp., 382 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D. Miss. 1974), aff'd, 515
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1975) (misrepresentation irrelevant to purchasers). Marks violative of section 2(e)
would most likely satisfy requirements (1) and (2) because of their misdescriptiveness--a type of
falsity-and deceptiveness. However, under section 2(e) as interpreted by this Article, requirement
(3) would be lacking since a determination that section 2(e) applies includes a determination that the
deception was immaterial to the purchaser. Requirement (4) would be satisfied since objection to
registration of a mark is raised either in an opposition proceeding or in a cancellation proceeding,
both of which require the complainant to be damaged or be in a position to be damaged by
registration of the mark on the principal register. Lanham Act §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64(1970).
Thus, due to the absence of"materiality"-the very feature that should be used to distinguish section
2(e) marks from section 2(a) marks-section 2(e) marks would not be actionable under section 43(a).
Conversely, section 2(a) marks necessarily would violate section 43(a) since to be "deceptive" under
section 2(a), a mark must be (1) false, (2) deceptive, and (3) materially deceptive to the purchaser.
(Again, the "damage" component would be included in the requirements for bringing an opposition
or cancellation proceeding). Consequently, while section 43(a) would allow section 2(e) marks to
survive (both before and after any subsequent registration under section 2(0), it would permanently condemn section 2(a) marks-a result wholly consistent with section 2(a)'s intent and
operation to permanently bar registration of such marks. Thus, it should be concluded that "Old
Crow Whiskey" does not come within section 43(a).
In response to Kitch and Perlman's observation that sections 2(a) and 2(e) refer to "trademarks"
and "marks" respectively, whereas section 43(a) contains no reference to either (see Kitch &
Perlman, supra note 3, at 432), it should be noted that section 43(a) was not designed specifically
for use in ordinary trademark cases, but was intended to broadly cover situations where "the
trademark itself describes or represents a false characteristic of the goods or services to which it
relates, and to cases truly involving false designations of geographical origin." Germain, Unfair
Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too
Far, Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84, 111-12 (1973), reprinted in 64 Trademark Rep. 193, 221 (1974), 13
Publishing Entertainment Advertising L.Q. 215, 246 (1974) (emphasis deleted). Thus, marks such
as NORMINK for imitation fur, and SCOTCH for Panamanian whiskey, were properly held
actionable. See Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), and Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973).
129. "Loken" is a fanciful amalgam of the given names of this Article's author and his wife. It
has often been used as the mythical jurisdiction in which moot court cases arise.

1975]

TRADEMARK DECEPTION

(1) If LOKEN is a common variety of bird (which of course has nothing to do with
lollipops), then it is an "arbitrary" mark and is registrable under section I without
recourse to section 2.130
(2) If LOKEN means "sweet" and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are sweet, then it is "merely
descriptive" under section 2(e)(1) and cannot be registered except under section 2().
(3) If LOKEN is a well-known geographic area and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are
manufactured there, then it is "primarily geographically descriptive" under section
2(e)(2) and cannot be registered except under section 2(f).
(4) If LOKEN means "enormous" and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are miniatures, then it is
misdescriptive, but not deceptively so, and it is registrable without recourse to
section 2.131

(5) If LOKEN is the name of a West Indian resort island not known for any
commercial goods, and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are not made there, then it is
geographically misdescriptive, but not deceptively so, and it is registrable without
recourse to section 2.132
(6) If LOKEN means "gelatin" and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS do not contain any gelatin,
and purchasers are fooled but do not care, then it is "merely . . . deceptively
misdescriptive"
under section 2(e)(1) and it cannot be registered except under
133
section 2(f).
(7) If LOKEN is the name of a geographic area that is well known as a source of
manufactured goods other than foodstuffs, and although purchasers are misled into
believing that LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are made there they really do not care, then it
is "primarily geographically... misdescriptive" under section 2(e)(2) and cannot be
registered except under section 2(0.134
(8) If LOKEN means "sugarless" and LOKEN LOLLIPOPS are not sugarless, and
purchasers are thus misled with regard to something they do
13 care about, then it is
"deceptive" under section 2(a) and can never be registered.
(9) If LOKEN is the name of town famed for its candy industry, and LOKEN
LOLLIPOPS bear no relationship to that town, and purchasers are thus misled
130. Likewise, of course, if LOKEN is merely a coined, meaningless term, it is a "fancifur'
mark and registrable without recourse to section 2.
131. AUTOMATIC RADIO for air conditioners was correctly analyzed this way. In re
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1969); see discussion in text accompanying
notes 12-13, 56-58 supra.

132. Cf. Eastern Constr. Co. v. Eastern Eng'r Corp., 246 N.Y. 459, 466, 159 N.E. 397,
399-400 (1927) (Crane, J., dissenting) (action to enjoin use of trade name EASTERN).
133. GLASS WAX is the prototype example here. See discussion in text accompanying notes
81-84 supra.
134. ITALIAN MAIDE for canned vegetables and LONDON for phonograph records are apt
examples. See discussions in text accompanying notes 85-89, 93-97 and 55 supra, respectively.
135. See, e.g., Sponge & Chamois Institute v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 120 U.S.P.Q. 309
(T.T.A.B. 1959) (CHAMI SPONGE for synthetic sponges); Ex parte Makers of Kal, Inc., 114
U.S.P.Q. 504 (Comm'r Pats. 1957) (THE PRESIDENT'S FORMULA for vitamins having no
connection with the United States President).
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with regard to something they do136care about, then it is "deceptive" under section
2(a) and can never be registered.
136. See, e.g., In re Danish Maid Cultured Prods., Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 430 (T.T.A.B. 1967)
(DANISH MAID for non-Danish dairy products); In re Richemond, 131 U.S.P.Q. 441 (T.T.A.B.
1961) (MAID IN PARIS for non-Parisian perfumes).

